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Abstract
We explore the role of the ownership structure of capital in an econ-
omy that suﬀers from barriers to entry and an imperfect financial system.
In such an environment, an unequal distribution of capital provides an
explanation for trade flows and trade gains even when countries do not
diﬀer in relative factor endowments or available technologies. Moreover,
an uneven asset distribution is associated with a large import-competing
sector and only a small number of export-oriented entrepreneurs. Along
these lines, we suggest that an unequal asset distribution may be key to
understand why still many less developed countries protect their firms
from foreign competition.
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1 Introduction
We analyze how the asset distribution influences trade flows and patterns in an
economy characterized by monopolistic goods markets and an imperfect finan-
cial system. The model developed here shows that - in such an environment
- an unequal wealth distribution (among entrepreneurs) is associated with a
large import-competing sector and only a small number of export-oriented en-
trepreneurs. Our analysis does not rely on diﬀerences in relative factor endow-
ments or technology but explores the role of the ownership structure of capital
in presence of imperfect markets.
Along these lines, we suggest that an unequal asset distribution may be
key to understand why still many less developed countries (LDCs) protect their
firms from foreign competition. While it is true that some developing countries
reduced their tariﬀs during the last two decades or so, average tariﬀs are still
high when compared to those in industrial countries.1 In addition, only looking
at changes in tariﬀs may be misleading because the use of non-tariﬀ measures
and ”behind the border measures” is yet widespread or even on the rise in the
developing world.2
Our analysis is based on three central assumptions. First, under autarky,
there is imperfect competition on the goods markets in the integrating country
(the South). Second, capital is unevenly distributed among entrepreneurs and
the capital market is imperfect. Third, the economy of the integrating coun-
try is relatively backward in the sense that no firm or no sector has access to
technologies allowing the production of varieties that have no perfect substitute
counterparts on the Northern goods market. In contrast, there are Northern
firms supplying - either competitively or monopolistically - ”new” goods, i.e.
goods that are only recently developed and exclusively produced in the North.
So, in our economy, an entrepreneur is endowed with two values simultane-
1For instance, average unweighted tariﬀs in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1998 were still four
times as high as in developed countries (World Bank, 2001).
2For instance, Latin American countries that cut tariﬀs to a large extent during the nineties
turned to antidumping laws in order to substitute for the tariﬀ restrictions (World Bank, 2003).
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ously. On the one hand, he owns a monopoly that is protected from competition
by high trade barriers (foreign competitors) and, for instance, heavy regulation
of entry (domestic competitors) but not because the monopolist produces at the
world technology frontier. On the other hand, he holds productive resources that
can be allocated to produce own goods but also other commodities. However,
due to the monopolistic structure of the economy, an entrepreneur not intend-
ing to employ the whole endowment inside the firm can only lend the ”excess”
capital to other monopolists. Although we allow a monopolist only to produce
a single good, the model can easily be extended to incorporate multi-product
firms or conglomerates that seem to play an important role in the industrial
sector of some developing countries.
We suggest that these elements of the model mirror crucial features of poorer
economies. As discussed in detail by Rodrik (1988), limited competition seems
to be of particular importance in developing countries since the absence of a
serious antitrust policy and substantial administrative barriers to entry pro-
tect the incumbents also from domestic competitors. The prevalence of heavy
regulation of entry in poor countries has only recently been documented by
Djankov et al. (2002). Moreover, a large literature on corruption (e.g., De Soto,
1989) suggests that the administrative entry barriers are amplified by extensive
bribery. In contrast, monopoly positions due to product innovations are scarce
since, according to an empirical literature going back at least to Vernon (1966),
innovations take place primarily in the North. Further, there is do doubt that
a low per capita GDP and a low level of financial development go hand in hand
(e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000) due to, for instance, imperfect
enforcement of credit contracts or poor law enforcement in general (La Porta
et al., 1998). The part of capital market imperfections in restricting firm sizes
is documented in a number of empirical papers, among them Nugent and Nabli
(1992), Banerjee and Duflo (2002) and Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002).
Finally, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the wealth distribution -
approximated by the income distribution or the land distribution - is more un-
equal in poor countries (e.g., Deininger and Squire, 1998; Deininger and Olinto,
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2001), most of which lie in tropical regions. In a study on economic develop-
ment in the Americas Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) put forth an explanation
that has increasingly attracted attention in recent times. The hypothesis is
that tropical endowment leads to commodity production, and that commodity
production is associated with higher inequality in physical and human capital.
This channel has been tested by Easterly (2001) who finds a large negative ef-
fect of commodity exporting (using tropical location as an instrument) on the
middle class’ share in aggregate income. In an earlier paper, Bourguignon and
Morrisson (1990) find very similar correlations.
We show that in such an environment removing trade barriers increases the
incomes of those entrepreneurs who own much capital relative to the size of their
home market (export-oriented entrepreneurs) whereas those with a relatively
small capital endowment (import-competing entrepreneurs) lose. In addition,
we discuss how the size of the winning group and the trade flows depend on
the level of financial development, the wealth distribution, and the extent of
additional variety in the goods spectrum the integration causes.
The mechanism we focus on is simple. Suppose that there is a large number
of entrepreneurs, each of which is a monopoly supplier of a single diﬀerentiated
good. Assume further that capital, the only input in production, is unevenly
distributed among these monopolists. Due to the limited size of the home
market under autarky, a capital-rich entrepreneur will not have invested the
whole capital endowment into the own firm. To escape strongly decreasing
marginal returns and very low prices, he will lend some capital to entrepreneurs
that have to rely more or less on external finance. Those poorly capitalized
monopolists will indeed be induced to seek credit. Being restricted to small-
scale production under financial autarky, they face high prices and marginal
returns. Accordingly, it pays for them to increase production with borrowed
and ”cheap” capital to the extent the imperfect capital market allows.
Suppose now that the trade barriers are significantly cut back or removed at
all such that no monopolist can sustain monopoly power. In this new situation,
capital-rich entrepreneurs are no longer restricted to the small domestic demand
4
that forced them to charge low relative prices. Instead, they can sell now any
quantity they like at the prevalent world market price. As a consequence, the
capital-rich lenders increase their firm sizes - thereby driving up the interest rate
- and become exporters. Accordingly, their incomes improve. The incomes of the
borrowers are hit negatively by the opening. They not only face higher factor
costs but also decreasing relative prices. The reason for the price collapse is that
their goods are no longer ”scarce” since they can be (and are indeed) imported
from abroad. So, our model predicts that the capital-rich entrepreneurs - beside
producing for the home market - will be the exporters whereas the capital-poor
entrepreneurs have to share the home market with foreign suppliers after the
liberalization has taken place.
The size of the individual gains and losses in income, respectively, depends on
the extent capital can be directed from capital-rich to capital-poor entrepreneurs
under autarky. Only when the banking system, whether private or state-owned,
can attract ”suﬃcient” funds to finance the capital-poor monopolist, the size-
distribution of firms will resemble the eﬃcient one. Under these circumstances,
the wealthy capital holders gain only relatively little from a trade liberalization.
In contrast, if the financial system is poorly developed or works temporary bad,
the losers experience a small loss and the winners gain a lot.
The focus of our analysis is clearly on the short- (or medium) run eﬀects of
liberalization steps on the entrepreneur’s incomes. The reason is that short-run
eﬀects seem to be particularly important for the feasibility of trade reforms.
It should be noted, however, that we do not by any means ignore the large
literature pointing into the direction that trade liberalizations - at least if sup-
ported by other policy measures - contribute positively to economic growth and
incomes in the long run.3
Examples fitting well into our story can be found in recent economic history.
For instance, after independence, many African countries not only protected
their (urban) infant industry but started to tax heavily the exports of outward-
oriented industries in the agricultural (export crops) and the mining sector (e.g.,
3For a recent survey of the literature see Winters (2004).
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Bates, 1981, 1988). Taxation could either take place directly by the use of export
marketing boards (that were established by the colonial powers to stabilize
incomes in presence of fluctuating commodity prices) or indirectly by overvalued
exchange rates. As noted by McMillan (2001), the taxation of some crops was
so heavy that the government found itself on the decreasing part of the Laﬀer-
Curve thereby discouraging investment by capitalist farmers. Remembering that
the crop exporters and the miners were major owner of asset (Bourguignon and
Morrisson, 1990; Easterly, 2001), we suggest that this (at first sight puzzling)
policy choice must have been to the benefit of the urban manufacturers and
industrialist. The reason is that the excess taxation was likely to direct ”cheap”
productive resources, i.e. capital, towards urban entrepreneurs operating in
protected sectors. In this sense, excess taxation of exports was complementary
to other policy measures taken at that time in order to benefit the members
of the powerful urban groups of manufacturers and industrialist (and, perhaps,
their workers).
Still today, an important stylized fact about the production system in poor
countries is that the size-distribution of firms is dualistic. There is a large
number of smaller and credit-rationed businesses producing mainly for the home
market and small number of larger entrepreneurs,4 reflecting - ceteris paribus -
an uneven asset distribution in presence of an imperfect financial system. Even
if there is now much less export taxation than half a century ago, the export
barriers a (potential) Southern exporter faces are still high. Since reciprocity
is an important element in international trade negotiations, the level of import
barriers a home exporter faces in foreign markets is tied to the level of import
barriers at home. Assume now that a typical poor country decides to join
an integration agreement that simultaneously and significantly decreases the
import barriers at home and those import barriers the exporters face in foreign
markets. According to our model, the capital-rich entrepreneurs will experience
an increase in the relative price for their goods and, consequently, employ more
4See, for instance, Liedholm and Mead (1999) or Tybout (2000) for a discussion of the
size-distribution in the manufacturing sector.
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capital inside their own firms thereby driving up the interest rate. As described
above, this general equilibrium eﬀect hurts the smaller entrepreneurs relying on
external finance. Accordingly, free trade redistributes income from the large
number of relatively small entrepreneurs towards the narrow group of large
producers.
Note that our model diﬀers in several dimensions from models relying on
competitive goods markets, among them Mayer’s (1984) median-voter model
and Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) special-interest group model, that con-
tributed to the literature on ”the political economy of trade policy”. By as-
suming that capital is the only factor of production and that all firms have
the same cost function we rule out redistribution on grounds of relative factor
endowments or specific factor ownership. Instead, we are assuming production
possibilities very similar to those in Krugman (1979). Yet, under autarky, we al-
low the Southern producers to have monopoly power that is, however, removed
when switching to a free trade regime. The conjecture that firms face a higher
elasticity of demand in the export markets (and, consequently, in the integrated
world market after the trade liberalization has taken place) has been brought up
by many authors, among them Rieber (1982) and Dixit (1984). Helpman and
Krugman (1989) call the idea that international trade increases competition the
oldest insight in the area of trade policy and imperfect competition. We stress
that this pro-competitive eﬀect is of particular relevance in developing countries
and are then interested in redistribution within the class of entrepreneurs due
to increased competitive pressure, i.e. in the change of the returns to the mobile
and homogeneous factor (here capital).5
Consistent with this focus, we do not allow for industry-specific tariﬀs or
subsidies. The analysis presented here is on a higher level of aggregation. Our
aim is not to explain cross-industry variations in tariﬀs but to analyze the
5Trade policy cannot aﬀect the return to the ”mobile” factor in Grossman and Helpman
(1994) because there is a freely traded numeraire good that is manufactured with constant
returns to scale form the ”mobile” factor alone. Mayer’s (1984) analysis in Section III assumes
that the ”mobile” factor is equally distributed among the individuals.
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distributional consequences of, for instance, the decision to join or to absent
from an integration agreement that aﬀects import or export restrictions for the
whole manufacturing sector.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic
model for a closed economy and shows existence and uniqueness of the equi-
librium. The eﬀects of trade liberalization on the income distribution and on
the size-distribution of firms are explored in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive
comparative static results. In particular, we discuss the impact of changes in
the level of financial development or the wealth distribution on both the income
distribution and the size-distribution of firms. Section 5 discusses the main
results and concludes.
2 The Closed Economy
2.1 Preferences and the Industry Structure
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals. The population size is
normalized to 1. The individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their initial
capital endowment ωi, i ∈ [0, 1], and their production possibilities. The initial
wealth endowments are distributed according to the distribution function G(ω),
which gives the measure of the population with wealth less than ω. We further
assume that g(ω), the density function, is positive over the whole range [0,ω],
where ω denotes the highest wealth level in the economy.
Each individual is a monopoly supplier of a single diﬀerentiated good and
has access to a technology that allows to transform 1 capital unit into 1 unit
of output. Capital is the only input into production. Throughout the whole
analysis, we abstract from state-owned enterprises.
The assumption concerning the industry structure is motivated by the fol-
lowing observations that, however, are not explicitly built into the model. Typ-
ically, there are significant barriers to entry in poor countries. These barriers
may either take the form of both time- and cost-intense oﬃcial procedures as-
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sociated with the set-up of new production facilities as described, for instance,
by Djankov et al. (2002). Or they may consist of high corruption (De Soto,
1989) or both. In combination with a relatively small home demand, these
barriers to entry protect the incumbents. Moreover, in very poor countries
where family businesses account for the overwhelming part of economic activ-
ity (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001), specific business skills are transferred
down through the generations and are not easily accessible for entrants. The
model could be extended to allow for multi-product monopolists or conglomer-
ates that play in important role in some developing countries (Leﬀ, 1978). It
should be noted, however, that a large part of the plants are owned by single
plant firms.6
The utility function of the individuals is assumed to be of the familiar CES-
form
U =


1Z
0
c
σ−1
σ
j dj


σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (1)
where cj is consumption of good j. Note that all goods produced in the closed
economy enter the utility function symmetrically.7 Hence, each monopolist faces
the same isoelastic demand curve. Individual i maximizes the objective function
(1) subject to the budget constraint
1Z
0
pjcjdj = y(ωi), (2)
where pj is the price of good j. y(ωi) is defined as individual i’s nominal income
that, of course, depends on the individuals initial capital endowment. The
exact functional relationship between income and initial wealth is specified in
6Clerides et al. (1998) report that, in semi-industrialized countries where the calculation
is possible, 95 percent of the plants are owned by single-plant firms.
7In principle, the individuals have preferences over a larger spectrum of goods. However,
since only goods in the range [0, 1] are produced under autarky, all integrands c
(σ−1)/σ
j with
j > 1 are zero in equilibrium. So, we may think of equation (1) as a reduced form utility
function.
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Subsection 2.3. Under these conditions, individual i’s demand for the jth good
is given by
cj(y(ωi)) =
³pj
P
´−σ y(ωi)
P
, (3)
where P =
hR 1
0
pj
1−σdj
i1/(1−σ)
is the familiar CES price index. In a goods mar-
ket equilibrium, aggregate demand for good j must be equal to its supply which
is, due to the linear technology, equal to the capital invested into entrepreneur
j’s firm, kj . As it is shown in the following subsection, kj may depend on wealth
endowment ωj . The goods market equilibrium condition allows us to express
the real price of good j as a function of the firm size and the real output:
pj
P
=
p(kj)
P
≡
µ
Y
P
¶ 1
σ
k
−1/σ
j , (4)
where Y ≡
R 1
0
p(kj)kjdj is the nominal output in our economy. Note that, in
a goods market equilibrium, the real price is strictly decreasing in the firm size
kj . The reason is simple. A larger investment translates one-to-one into higher
output. Since the marginal utility from consuming a given good decreases in the
quantity consumed, the consumers can only be induced to buy higher quantities
by lower prices.
Later on, it will be helpful to have an expression for the real output (utility
of an entrepreneur earning the average income) that depends only on the size-
distribution of firms. Using equation (4) in the definition of the nominal output,
we obtain
Y
P
=


1Z
0
k
σ−1
σ
j dj


σ
σ−1
. (5)
Henceforth we use P = 1 as the nume´raire. This implies that nominal output
equals real output. In addition, for ease of notation, we do not distinguish
between the indices for goods and the indices for individuals.
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2.2 The Capital Market
Individuals may borrow on a capital market. Unlike the goods market, the
capital market is competitive in the sense that both lenders and borrowers take
the equilibrium rate as given. However, we assume that the capital market is
imperfect since borrowing at the equilibrium interest rate may be limited. Fol-
lowing Matsuyama (2000) in the modelling of the imperfection, credit-rationing
arises from imperfect enforcement of (credit) contracts.8 The way we model the
credit market, although stylized, seems to be relevant in the context of devel-
oping countries. Many authors stress that access to debt is not limited because
the lenders have significant monopoly power over clients but because of poor
collateral law and weak judicial law, making it hard to enforce contracts in a
court.9 In the event of default, borrower i loses only a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of his
project output p(ki)ki. The parameter λ can be viewed as a measure for the
level of financial development. A small λ means that creditor rights are poorly
developed whereas a value close to 1 stands for strong creditor protection. Note
that poor law enforcement prevents individuals in our model also from over-
coming the credit market imperfection by pooling their wealth endowment and
running, for instance, a two-product firm. La Porta et. al. (1998) provide some
empirical evidence showing that poor legal protection results in high ownership
concentration.
Taking into account the borrower’s incentives, a lender will only give credit
up to λp(ki)ki/ρi where ρi denotes the interest rate entrepreneur i faces. So, a
borrower will never renege on his debt in equilibrium. Since there are no other
individual-specific risks associated with entrepreneurship, the interest rate is
the same for all borrowers: ρi = ρ, where i ∈ [0, 1].
The maximum amount that entrepreneur i can invest is then determined by
8This type of credit market imperfections, also known as costly state verification, was first
introduced by Townsend (1979).
9See, e.g., Ray (1998).
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k = ωi +
λ
ρp(k)k.
10 Using equation (4) we get
k = ω +
λ
ρ
Y
1
σ k
σ−1
σ . (6)
Equation (6) implicitly determines k as a function of ω.We denote this function
by k(ω). In the lemma below we show that, in equilibrium, the maximum amount
of credit and, consequently, the maximum investment depend positively on the
initial capital endowment. That is, initial wealth plays the role of a collateral
in our model. So, we get the intuitive result that wealthier individuals may run
larger firms. However the impact of an additional wealth unit on the firm size
decreases in the wealth level. This is because marginal return falls when the
firm grows large.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the maximum investment size is strictly increasing
and concave in the initial capital endowment.
Proof. The proof is most easily done by a graphical argument. Whereas the
left-hand side (LHS) of equation (6) increases one-for-one in k starting from
zero, the right-hand side (RHS) starts at ω and its slope reaches zero as k grows
very large. Thus, k is uniquely determined. An increase in ω shifts up the RHS
such that the new intersection of the LHS and the RHS lies to the right of the old
one. Having established that dkdω =
³
1− λρp(k)
σ−1
σ
´−1
> 0 and using equation
(4), we see that d
2k
dω2 < 0.
If not restricted by the capital market imperfection, an entrepreneur in-
creases his project size up to the point where the marginal revenue d[p(k)k]dk =
σ−1
σ Y
1/σk−1/σ is equal to the equilibrium interest rate ρ (marginal costs). So,
the optimal project size, denote it by ek, and the initial wealth endowment that
allows exactly for this project size, denote it by eω, are given by
ek = Y ρ−σ µσ − 1
σ
¶σ
(7)
10Since the initial wealth is the only individual specific factor that determines the maximum
firm size, the index for individuals will be dropped for the rest of this section. That is, we
write ω in place of ωi if convenient.
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and
eω =



³
1− λ σσ−1
´ek
0
:
:
λ < σ−1σ
λ ≥ σ−1σ
(8)
respectively. As can be seen from equation (8), there exists a group of restricted
entrepreneurs if and only if λ < σ−1σ . Instead, if λ ≥
σ−1
σ , even individuals with
zero capital endowment can choose the opimal firm size and will produce at
the point where marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Why? The smaller
σ (the elasticity of substitution), the higher is the constant mark-up σσ−1 over
marginal costs ρ. So, even for poor individuals, the project output relative to
the payment obligation is large if σ is small. This means that only a strong
capital market imperfection (a very low λ) leads a borrower to renege on his
debt. Put in other terms, the capital market imperfection is binding for some
individuals in equilibrium if and only if the imperfection in the capital market
is larger than the imperfection in the product market.
We are now ready to discuss the size-distribution of firms. The project sizes
of individuals with initial endowment between 0 and eω are implicitly determined
by equation (6). Since they are not able to implement the monopoly solution ek
we refer to them as credit-rationed entrepreneurs. By Lemma 1, the firm sizes
of these entrepreneurs increase in the initial wealth endowment ω. Individuals
whose endowments lie in the range [eω,ek] invest ek and borrow the diﬀerence ek−ω.
Finally, very rich individuals (ω > ek) manage a firm of size ek and, in addition,
act as lenders. So, given that the capital market imperfection is ”more severe”
than the goods market imperfection and given that there is a positive mass of
credit-rationed individuals, an uneven distribution of initial wealth endowments
and an uneven size-distribution of firms go hand in hand. The discussion so far
is summarized in equation (9) and in Figure 1.
k(ω) =



k(ω)ek :: ω < eωω ≥ eω (9)
Figure 1 here
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Since each firm faces the downward-sloping demand curve (4), the prices across
goods may diﬀer as well. Larger firms charge lower prices - despite the fact
that each good enters the utility function symmetrically. Note, however, that in
case of eω = 0 (no credit-rationing) firm sizes will fully equalize since each firm
has the same technology, faces the same demand curve and sets the same profit-
maximizing price. So, in our model, full equity is the ”natural” size-distribution,
i.e. the size-distribution that would emerge on the basis of technology and
market size alone. By equation (5), the ”natural” size-distribution maximizes
real output.
In the lemma below, the highest price paid in an equilibrium with a positive
mass of credit-rationed entrepreneurs is calculated.
Lemma 2 In an equilibrium with a positive mass of credit-rationed individuals,
the highest price is given by p(k(0)) = ρλ .
Proof. By Lemma 1, individuals with a zero wealth endowment run the
smallest firms and, consequently, charge the highest prices among the group of
credit-rationed entrepreneurs. In case of ω = 0, k(0) can be explicitly calculated
as (λ/ρ)σ Y. Using this expression in equation (4) results in p(k(0)) = ρλ .
The preceding discussion leads us directly to a specification of aggregate
(gross-) capital demand which is simply the sum over all firm sizes:
KD(ρ) =
∞Z
0
k(ω)dG(ω) =
eωZ
0
k(ω)dG(ω) +
∞Z
eω
ekdG(ω), (10)
Since the project sizes of both the restricted and unrestricted individuals depend
on ρ, aggregate capital demand depends on ρ as well. In contrast, aggregate cap-
ital is exogenous and therefore inelastically supplied: KS = E[ω] =
R∞
0
ωdG(ω).
The following proposition focuses on the capital market equilibrium. The equi-
librium is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 here
Proposition 1 There exists a unique capital market equilibrium.
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Proof. (i) We first focus on the case λ < σ−1σ (credit-rationing). It is not
possible to compute aggregate (gross-) capital demand explicitly. However, we
can show that capital demand decreases uniformly in ρ. Since (gross-) capital
demand is the sum over all individual project sizes, we have to determine how
these project size depend on ρ. The two derivatives are given by
dk(ω)
dρ
=
− λρ2 p(k(ω))k(ω) +
λ
ρ
1
σ
k(ω)
Y
³
k(ω)
Y
´−1/σ
dY
dρ
1− λρ
³
k(ω)
Y
´−1/σ
σ−1
σ
< 0
and
dek
dρ
=
ek
Y
dY
dρ
− Y ρ−σ−1σ
µ
σ − 1
σ
¶σ
< 0,
respectively.By Lemma 1, the denominator of the first equation is positive. Hold-
ing Y constant, an increase in the interest rate decreases both the firm sizes of
the credit-rationed entrepreneurs and ek. This means that dY/dρ must be nega-
tive (equation 5) as well. Thus, taking into account that Y adjusts endogenously
reinforces the direct eﬀect of the increase in the interest rate. To see that KD
monotonically decreases in ρ we show that dY/dρ is greater than minus infinity.
Using equation (5), we have
dY
dρ
=
eωZ
0
p(k(ω))
dk(ω)
dρ
dG(ω) +
∞Z
eω
p(ek)dek
dρ
dG(ω)
Using the expression for dk(ω)/dρ and dek/dρ in the above equation and rear-
ranging terms results in
dY
dρ
=


eωZ
0
p(k(ω))k(ω)
Y
x(ω)dG(ω) +
∞Z
eω
p(ek)ek
Y
dG(ω)

 dY
dρ
−∆,
where ∆ and the term in brackets are positive constants. The factor x(ω) is
given by
x(ω) =
λ
ρ
³
k(ω)
Y
´−1/σ
1
σ
1− λρ
³
k(ω)
Y
´−1/σ
σ−1
σ
.
15
Note that dY/dρ is greater than minus infinity if and only if the term in brackets
is strictly smaller than 1. Assume for a short while that x(ω) equals 1 for all
ω. In this case, the term in brackets is exactly 1. Thus, a suﬃcient condition
to establish that the term in brackets is smaller than 1 is λρ
¡
k(ω)/Y
¢−1/σ 1
σ <
1 − λρ
¡
k(ω)/Y
¢−1/σ σ−1
σ for some ω < eω. This is equivalent to λp(k(ω))/ρ <
1 for some ω < eω. Since the price of goods of individuals with endowment
zero is given by ρ/λ (Lemma 2) and the prices are decreasing in the firm
size (equation 4), the latter inequality holds for all individuals with ω > 0.
Hence, we may conclude that capital demand decreases uniformly in ρ. It is
easy to see that KD reaches zero at ρ = σ−1σ . In this situation, we have
ek =
Y =
hR eω
0
k(ω)(σ−1)/σdG(ω) + (1−G(eω))ek(σ−1)/σiσ/(σ−1) , where the first equal-
ity follows from equation (7). Since k(ω) < ek ∀ ω < eω and eω > 0, the only
solution to the above equation is ek = eω = 0 which means that capital demand
is zero. From equation (6) we know that KD goes to infinity as ρ approaches λ
from above. Since capital supply is constant, we can conclude that there exists
a unique equilibrium.
(ii) Assume now that λ ≥ σ−1σ (no credit-rationing). In this situation, capital
demand can easily be computed and is given by
R∞
0
ekdG(ω) = Y ρ−σ ¡σ−1σ ¢σ.
Since all agents run a firm of the same size, (gross-) capital supply, KS , can be
written as ek = Y. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate, which can be calculated by
equating capital demand and capital supply, is completely independent of capital
supply and equals σ−1σ . This means that the capital demand curve is horizontal
at σ−1σ .
Finally, consider the case λ = 0, a situation characterized by absent creditor
rights, in which default is not followed by sanctions. Under these circumstances,
the equilibrium is easily derived as the capital market does not exist at all. No
borrower would ever honour his debt and, consequently, there are no lenders.
In this benchmark case, the firm size of each agent would be given by his initial
capital endowment. By equation (5), real output is minimized.
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2.3 The Income Distribution
This subsection explores how the distribution of the initial capital endowments
and the income distribution are related. To this end we look at the function
that relates initial capital endowment, ω, to income, y:
y(ω) =



(1− λ)p(k(ω))k(ω)
p(ek)ek + (ω − ek)ρ :: ω < eωω ≥ eω (11)
The following lemma shows that income is a concave function of initial wealth.
Hence the income distribution is more equal than the distribution of capital
endowments.
Lemma 3 In an equilibrium, an individual’s income is strictly increasing and
concave in his initial capital endowment.
Proof. The marginal return of initial capital endowment is given by
dy(ω)
dω
=



(1− λ)σ−1σ p(k(ω))
h
1− λρp(k(ω))
σ−1
σ
i−1
ρ
:
:
ω < eω
ω ≥ eω (12)
The signs of both the upper and the lower expression in the above equation are
positive (see proof of Lemma 1). Whereas ρ is constant in an equilibrium, the
behaviour of dy/dω remains to be discussed if ω < eω. By Lemma 1, k is positively
related to ω and by equation (4), the price decreases in the firm size. This means
that the larger the initial capital endowment, ω, the smaller the numerator and
the bigger the denominator. Hence, if eω > 0, the marginal return decreases untileω is reached and then remains constant.
By showing that y is strictly concave as long as ω < eω, the above lemma
makes immediately clear that the income distribution must be more equal than
the endowment distribution in the case where eω > 0. This statement remains
true if λ ≥ σ−1σ and, consequently, eω = 0. In that case, the income function
takes the simple form Y/σ + σ−1σ ω. So, as long as the firms have monopoly
power, the income distribution is more equal than the wealth distribution. This
is an important point. Preventing trade in goods and capital benefits those
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monopoly producers who own only a relatively small capital endowment and,
consequently, face a relatively large home demand under financial autarky. The
monopolistic structure of the economy and the fact that capital and goods
cannot go abroad allow them to acquire ”cheap” productive resources and to
sell, relative to financial autarky, additional units at high prices.
In contrast, entrepreneurs having the own resources to set up a large-scale
production of their commodities suﬀer from being restricted to their relatively
small home markets, i.e. from not being allowed to export parts of their pro-
duction. In order to avoid driving down the prices at home too much they are
forced to leave some of their capital endowment - at unfavorable conditions - to
the smaller monopolists.
3 Integrating into the World Economy
This section explores the distributional consequences of scaling back trade bar-
riers, i.e. the changes in manufacturers’ incomes due to an integration into
the North’ competitive goods markets. In Subsection 3.2 the baseline case of
competitive supply of all goods is considered whereas in Subsection 3.3 some
Southern firms can sustain their monopoly power.
3.1 Assumptions
Until now it was assumed that the trade barriers were suﬃciently high to make
trade between the North and the South impossible. For analytical tractability
we now simply focus on the opposite case, i.e. on the case where the tariﬀs or
non-tariﬀ barriers that prohibited either imports or exports or both are cut back
to zero. Moreover, we assume that there are no other obstacles to trade such
as transportation costs between the North and the South. So, the law of one
price holds for every good. In addition to that we have to make assumptions
concerning the world population, the industry structure that prevails in the
integrated (world) market, the technology available in the North, and the level
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of financial development in the North.
Individuals. The world is populated by a continuum of individuals of size
L > 1. The South consists of individuals on the interval [0, 1]. The remain-
ing individuals are located in the North. Individuals elsewhere have the same
preferences. The preferences are similar to those in equation (1) unless that we
account for the fact that the integration may increase the spectrum of available
goods in the South (and also in the North):
U =


nZ
0
c
σ−1
σ
j dj


σ
σ−1
. (1’)
The above utility function indicates that the spectrum of available goods - which
is the same for all individuals - is now given by [0, n]. Accordingly, the CES price
index is now given by P =
£R n
0
pj
1−σdj
¤1/(1−σ)
. As in the previous section, the
price level is normalized to 1 such that nominal income measures utility derived
from optimal consumption.
Industry Structure. The North competitively produces goods on the range
[m,n], where 0 ≤ m < 1 and n ≥ 1. Two qualitatively diﬀerent industry
structures are considered in turn.
First, in Subsection 3.2, it is assumed that m = 0 so that the goods man-
ufactured in the South form the subset [0, 1] of the continuum of goods that
is produced in the North. Thus, the South produces only commodities which
can be (and are indeed) produced by a large number of Northern producers.
As a consequence, the integration removes the monopoly power of the Southern
manufacturers. To put it in other terms, no sector or no firm in the Southern
economy has access to a technology that allows to produce goods that the North
cannot produce. The reverse, however, does not hold. By assuming n ≥ 1 we
allow the North to have access to a broader set of technologies and therefore
to have more variety. We may think of goods with a high index as recently
developed goods (”new goods”) that are exclusively produced in the innovating
North. The remaining goods are developed some time ago (”old goods”) and
can - as a result of technology transfer - also be produced in the non-innovating
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South.11 Note further that assuming competitive supply of the goods exclusively
produced in North is just for convenience and is not crucial to our argument.
Since we may interpret the goods close to n as the most recently developed ones
we could assume that they are monopolistically supplied (due to, for instance,
temporary patent protection) without altering the qualitative results.
Second, in Subsection 3.3, it is assumed that m ∈ (0, 1) implying that a
fraction m > 0 of Southern entrepreneurs (those who are located on the interval
[0,m)) can sustain market power. Thus, their monopoly position is not granted
by artificial barriers to entry (as it is the case for the remaining Southern firms
under autarky) but, for instance, by innovative activities. The remaining firms
in the South (as well as all Northern firms) behave competitively on the inte-
grated goods markets. Intuitively, we consider a country with a higher fraction
of firms producing goods with no perfect substitute counterparts on the inte-
grated market as (economically) more advanced.
Technology. We continue to assume that one unit of capital is required
to produce one unit of a good. Accordingly, the firm producing the specific
good j ∈ [m, 1] in the South has access to the same technology as the large
number of firms producing the same good in the North. This assumption is
just to make things as simple as possible. The distributional consequences of a
trade liberalization to be derived below do not hinge on this assumption.12 Since
technology is the same across regions, total output of good j is given by the sum
of capital invested into its production, klj . The superscript l ∈ {I, II] indicates
whether we consider the case of competitive supply of all goods (Regime I) or
the case of monopolistic supply of some Southern goods (Regime II). For the
rest of this section we replace kj in the equations (4) and (5) by k
l
j and add up
over the range [0, n] to calculate Y l that refers now to worldwide real output.
Capital Markets and Capital Supply. We continue to assume that
11In this sense, our assumptions concerning the production possibilities are very similar to
that in Krugman (1979).
12In particular, if we assumed a lower productivity in the South, one can show that relative
change in income due to an integration is the same in both situations.
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neither entrepreneurs nor capital is mobile across regions. As a consequence,
the interest rates in North and the South may diﬀer. The capital market in
the North is assumed to be perfect whereas the South (possibly) suﬀers form
an imperfect financial system. Finally, we presume that the aggregate capital
endowment in the North is large relative to that in the South in a sense to be
made precise below.
3.2 Removed Monopoly Power (Regime I)
In a competitive equilibrium, the price of a specific good must be equal to the
marginal costs of producing that good. Since all firms in a given region, either
the South or the North, face the same marginal costs, prices across goods must
be equal as well. Given that the law of one price between the two regions
holds, the goods prices in the South must adjust to the level that has already
prevailed in the North. Since prices equal marginal costs and the technology is
the same across regions the interest rates must also be the same. More formally,
all goods prices pj , j ∈ [0, n], and the interest rate in the South take the value
pj = p
I ≡ n 1σ−1 = ρI after the integration has been completed.13 According
to equation (4), for the prices to equalize, worldwide production of each good
must equalize as well. Since we assume that aggregate capital endowment in
the North is large, worldwide investment into the production of each good may
equalize no matter what the level of financial development in the South is and no
matter what the distribution of capital endowments in the South looks like. So,
we have kIj = k
I =
R L
0
ω(i)di/n for all goods j in the range [0, n]. Worldwide
aggregate output is given by Y I =
R n
0
pIkIdj = n
σ
σ−1 kI . Real income in the
South can be calculated as
R 1
0
pIωidi = n
1
σ−1
R 1
0
ωidi = n
1
σ−1KS . According
to equation (5), KS is the maximum real output under autarky that can only
be attained if λ ≥ σ−1σ . Thus, there are two channels through which the trade
liberalization may increase real income in the South. First, if λ < σ−1σ , the
13To see that pI equals n1/(σ−1) remember that the choice of the nume´raire implies that
1 =
£R n
0
¡
pI
¢
1−σdj
¤1/(1−σ)
.
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integration leads to a more even supply of goods. Second, if n > 1, free trade
with the North brings more variety. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 2 A move from autarky to free trade that removes market power
of all Southern monopolists increases aggregate income in the South if either
λ < σ−1σ or n > 1.
An immediate corollary of the analysis so far is that the function relating
real income to the initial capital endowment takes now the particularly simple
form yI(ωi) ≡ pIωi = n
1
σ−1ωi. Comparing this function with equation (11) we
see how the integration changes the income distribution in the South. In Figure
3, income under autarky as a function of capital endowment is shown for three
diﬀerent levels of financial development.
Figure 3 here
Whereas the curve OD represents a situation with inexistent capital markets, the
curves OC and OB are drawn for an intermediate level of λ and for λ ≥ σ−1σ ,
respectively. The radiant OA represents yI(ωi), i.e. the situation after the
integration has taken place. The figure shows that, with respect to changes
in real income, the trade liberalization divides the class of entrepreneurs into
two diﬀerent groups. Entrepreneurs with a capital endowment above ω∗, where
ω∗ is defined by y(ω∗) = yI(ω∗), win whereas the poorer manufacturers lose.
The exact size of the winning and the losing group, respectively, depends on
how much additional variety the integration generates, on the level of financial
development and on the distribution of initial capital endowments. The latter
two determinants are discussed in detail in the following section. However, the
central result that there are two groups whose members are aﬀected diﬀerently
is independent of the three determinants.
Proposition 3 Consider a move from autarky to free trade that removes mar-
ket power of all Southern monopolists. Then there exists always an endowment
level ω∗ ∈ (0,ω) such that the incomes of entrepreneurs with ω < ω∗ decrease
and the incomes of entrepreneurs with ω > ω∗ increase.
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Proof. Suppose first that λ > 0. The properties of y(ωi) derived in Lemma
(3) ensure that there is exactly one crossing (from above) with the radiant yI(ωi).
Since y(0) > 0 and n < ∞ the threshold level ω∗ is strictly bigger than 0. To
derive an upper bound for ω∗, assume that n = 1. Under autarky, from equations
(4) and (7), we have p(ek) ≤ 1 or, equivalently, y(ek) ≤ ek. Note that yI(ek) equalsek so that y(ek) ≤ yI(ek). Since ek < ω for any non-degenerate distribution of
capital endowments we conclude that ω∗ ≤ ek < ω.
Suppose now that λ = 0. In this case, we have y(0) = 0 and lim
ω→0
dy(ω)
dω →∞
which leads us to the conclusions that y(0) = yI(0) and that y(ω) > yI(ω) for
ω close to zero (note that the individuals with ω = 0, which are only of measure
0, are unaﬀected). To derive an upper bound for ω∗, let’s again assume that
n = 1. Then, under autarky and given a non-degenerate distribution of initial
capital endowments, we have p(ω) < 1 or, equivalently, y(ω) < ω = yI(ek).
Intuitively, under autarky, the entrepreneurs face downward sloping demand
and marginal return curves in the home market. In addition, they cannot export
capital or parts of their production. To avoid very low relative prices for their
goods at home and due to the lack of other business opportunities, capital-rich
individuals are forced to lend resources to other monopolists who face - relative
to their own production possibilities - a large home demand. The removal of
trade barriers alters the situation completely. It is true that also the wealthy
lose their monopoly power but, at the same time, they no longer suﬀer from the
low returns on the capital that cannot be employed in their own firms under
autarky. So, they face better business opportunities in the sense that they can
serve a larger demand. In addition, they benefit from more variety (if n > 1)
and from a more even supply of goods (if λ < σ−1σ ). The benefits turn out to
have a stronger impact on real income than the loss of the monopoly power if the
capital endowment lies above some threshold level. The poorer individuals, in
contrast, lose because the monopoly position oﬀered them high returns on their
relatively small wealth endowment and rents on each capital unit borrowed.
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How does the size-distribution of firms in the South change in response to
this type of integration? As a result of the loss of monopoly power, the maximum
amount of individual investment under free trade, k
I
(ω), is given by 11−λω. Since
dk(ω)
dω
¯¯¯¯
ω<eω >
dk(ω)
dω
¯¯¯¯
ω=eω =
1
1− λ =
dk
I
(ω)
dω
and since k(0) > k
I
(0) we know that the firm sizes of individuals with wealth
endowment in the range [0, (1−λ)ek] are larger under autarky than they can be
in a free-trade regime (see Figrue 4).
Figure 4 here
Accordingly, individuals with a relatively small wealth endowment have to scale
down their firm sizes whereas some of the substantially endowed entrepreneurs
will employ more capital. The exact production structure under free trade,
however, remains indeterminate as a result of perfect competition and CRS-
technology.
Note further that there are trade flows even in the absence of diﬀerences in
relative factor endowments or technology. The trade flows are determined by
the wealth distribution. The capital-rich entrepreneurs tend to be the exporters.
Perfect substitutes of goods produced by capital-poorer entrepreneurs will be
imported.
3.3 Sustained Monopoly Power (Regime II)
Very similar to the case above, worldwide production as well as the prices of the
competitively supplied goods must equalize in the new equilibrium. Thus, we
have kIIj = k
II
C and p
II
j = p
II
C for j ∈ [m,n], where the subscript C identifies a
competitively supplied commodity. These adjustments of quantities and prices
are accompanied by an adjustment of the interest rate both in the North and the
South. The interest rate will be equal to the price of the competitively supplied
goods: ρII = pIIC . Things change when it comes to the Southern producers
(those on the interval [1,m)) who can sustain market power.
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For a monopolistic supplier j marginal revenue is still given by σ−1σ p(kj).
Such an entrepreneur produces a quantity ekII < kIIC that equates marginal
revenue with marginal cost, ρII , if he has enough own resources or, alternatively,
if he has suﬃcient access to the capital market. Otherwise, he will produce
the largest possible quantity, k
II
(ω) < ekII < kIIC , where the definitions of
k
II
(ω) and ekII are analogous to that in the equations (6) and (7). Given
this production structure, the marginal return on capital of those entrepreneurs
who lose their monopoly power will be lower than in the case considered above:
pIIC < p
I = n
1
σ−1 . However, for the rest of this subsection, we assume that n is
large relative to m so that pIIC lies above 1 and only slightly below p
I .
How do the distributional consequences diﬀer from that discussed in Sub-
section 3.2? Again, the liberalization divides the group of entrepreneurs whose
monopoly power is removed into a losing and into a winning subgroup. The
poorer of them lose whereas the richer win. Clearly, very capital-rich en-
trepreneurs with sustained market power win. They not only face higher prices
due to a larger demand but also higher returns on capital not employed in the
own firm. The eﬀect on the incomes on the relatively poor monopolists, how-
ever, is ambiguous. On the one hand, they benefit also from a larger demand.
On the other hand, capital costs go up. The net eﬀect will be positive if the
increase in market size is ”large enough”. To see this, we consider the situation
of an entrepreneur that is credit-rationed both in the old and the new equilib-
rium. Remember that the income of a credit-rationed entrepreneur is given by
(1 − λ)p
³
k
II
(ω)
´
k
II
(ω) = (1 − λ)
¡
Y II
¢1/σ ³
k
II
(ω)
´(σ−1)/σ
. Since Y II will
be larger than the real output that prevailed in the South under autarky, the
income of a credit-rationed entrepreneur will rise if the maximum amount of
investment decreases not to strong or if it even rises. But this will be the case
if the aggregate capital endowment in the North is large and, consequently,
the ratio
¡
Y II
¢1/σ
/ρII (that determines k
II
(ω)) is big relative to the situation
in autarky. We conclude that there is - beside the group of capital rich en-
trepreneurs - another group of entrepreneurs that is likely to win. This group
consists of smaller entrepreneurs who are at the world technology frontier in the
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sense that they can sustain monopoly power in the integrated market.
Whereas in the case of 0 < m < 1 the number of winners of a trade liber-
alization is likely to be larger than in the case considered above, there are no
losers whatsoever if all monopolist in the South can sustain their market power
(m = 1). It can be shown that in such a situation the firm sizes as well as the
mark-ups are unaﬀected by the change in the trade regime. The intuition be-
hind this result is easy to see. The integration into the Northern goods market
shifts up the demand curves of the Southern monopolists. Given the interest
rate, access to external finance of the credit-rationed individuals improves and
the unrestricted individuals are induced to manage larger firms. The capital de-
mand curve shifts to the right whereas capital supply remains constant since we
assume that capital is immobile between the two regions. So, the interest rate
rises. The jump in the interest rate has exactly the opposite eﬀect on the firm
sizes as the rise in the prices, and it turns out that the net eﬀect is identically
zero for all firms. This is because the CES-preferences imply that each firms
experiences the same increase in the market size when we move to a free trade
regime. As a consequence of these adjustments, the incomes of all entrepreneurs
rise relatively to the same extent and no distributional conflicts emerge.
We conclude that a - in terms of production possibilities - more advanced
country is more prone to adopt a free trade policy since the number of losing
entrepreneurs is likely to be small. To put it another way, we expect in countries
with a larger number of firms close to the world technology frontier - ceteris
paribus - more political support for a trade liberalization.
4 Comparative Static Results
In this section we explore how variations in the level of financial development
(Subsection 4.1) and variations in the distribution of initial capital endowments
(Subsection 4.2) aﬀect the incomes under autarky and, consequently, the thresh-
old level ω∗ that separates winners form losers. This exercise provides insights
into political feasibility of trade liberalizations since it allows us to discuss the
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determinants of both the size of the losing group and the changes in income. For
simplicity of exposition we assume that the North produces the same continuum
of goods as the South (n = 1) so that income as a function of initial wealth is
given by the 45-degree radiant under free trade.
In the subsequent discussion we use the Dalton Principle (Dalton, 1920) to
rank the income distributions and the size-distributions of firms with respect
to inequality. That is, if one distribution can be achieved from another by
constructing a sequence of regressive transfers, i.e. transfers from a set of poorer
individuals (smaller firms) to a set of richer individuals (bigger firms), then the
former distribution is more unequal than the latter. Note that, because of
decreasing marginal contribution to real output with respect to individual firm
sizes (equation 5), a more uneven size-distribution of firms translates into a
lower real output, Y.
4.1 Variation in the Capital Market Eﬃciency
How the incomes under autarky (and therefore ω∗) depend on the initial capital
endowments is easily discussed in case of λ ≥ (σ − 1)/σ or in case of λ = 0. As
noted earlier, y(ω)|λ≥(σ−1)/σ equals Y/σ+ σ−1σ ω, where σ−1σ is the equilibrium
interest rate. If capital markets are absent (λ = 0), income is simply given by
the revenue generated by running a firm of size ω: y(ω)|λ=0 = Y 1/σω(σ−1)/σ.14
Note that the function y(ω)|λ≥(σ−1)/σ does not depend on the distribution of
initial capital endowments whereas y(ω)|λ=0 = Y 1/σω(σ−1)/σ clearly does. It is
obvious that any y(ω)|λ>0-curve must lie everywhere above the y(ω)|λ=0-line.
Clearly, all individuals are better oﬀ with λ > 0 since demand is higher com-
pared to a situation with λ = 0 (see Lemma 4 below). In addition, wealthy
entrepreneurs can escape strongly diminishing returns to investment by becom-
ing lenders on the credit market. This allows the small entrepreneurs to increase
their firm sizes (it is exactly this channel through which real output increases)
14Of course, the output Y depends on λ and on the distribution of capital endowments (if
λ < σσ−1 ).
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and to generate additional income on each capital unit borrowed.
This discussion gives us the basic relationship between the number of losers
and the level of financial development. Given the distribution of initial capital
endowments, there are few losers if the capital market does not exist (ω∗ is
relatively low) compared to a situation with a near perfect capital market where
ω∗ is relatively high (Figure 3). In addition, in the former case the negative
impact on the income of the poor is small whereas the income of the wealthier
entrepreneurs rises dramatically when we move from autarky to free trade. In
the latter case, exactly the opposite is true.
What happens to the incomes (and therefore to the threshold level ω∗) under
autarky if λ is increased from some arbitrary positive level? In order to discuss
the correlation between λ and ω∗ we have to figure out the relationship between
λ on the one hand and Y and ρ on the other hand first.
Lemma 4 If λ < σ−1σ , a rise in λ leads to a more even size-distribution of
firms and increases Y and ρ.
Proof. The firm sizes of the restricted and the unrestricted entrepreneurs
are determined by k(ωi) = ωi + λXk(ωi)
(σ−1)/σ and ek = Xσ [(σ − 1)/σ]σ, re-
spectively, where X ≡ Y 1/σ/ρ. It is immediately clear that X may not rise
when λ increases since, in such a case, both the restricted and unrestricted en-
trepreneurs would invest more, and, consequently, capital demand would exceed
capital supply. It is also obvious that λX must be larger in the new equilibrium
than in the old. Otherwise, each entrepreneur would invest less than before and
capital supply would exceed capital demand. Since X must fall and λX must
rise, the firm sizes in the new equilibrium are larger up to a certain bω and are
smaller above this threshold level (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 here
According to our definition, the size-distribution of firms is more equal in the
new equilibrium. By equation (5), the marginal contribution to real output of a
high−k firm is lower than that of a low−k firm. Hence, real output increases.
Now, we can immediately conclude that the interest rate must rise as well.
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There are (at most) three eﬀects influencing the incomes of the borrow-
ers and, consequently, the threshold level ω∗. First, there is the positive eﬀect
that stems from the upward-shift of the individual demand functions due to a
rising Y . Second, with λ and Y higher, individuals can borrow more. Accord-
ingly, credit-rationed entrepreneurs increase their firm sizes (given ρ) which, in
turn, increases their incomes (as marginal revenue exceeds marginal costs for
constrained agents). However, there is a third eﬀect. A better working legal
system leads to a higher interest rate. Due to the rise in ρ, the repayment obli-
gations increase as well. This negative influence on the borrower’s incomes may
be stronger than the positive demand eﬀect. This is exactly the reason why the
threshold level
ω∗ =



(1− λ)
h
(1− λ) + λρ
iσ−1
Y³
1
σ−1
´ ¡σ−1
σ
¢σ ρ1−σ
1−ρ Y
:
:
ω∗ < eω
ω∗ ≥ eω
that separates winners from losers may locally fall in λ.15 Consequently, despite
the globally positive relationship between the number of losers and the level of
financial development, the number of losers may fall locally at some intermediate
levels of λ. However, it can be shown that this may not happen when λ is close
to 0 or close to σ−1σ , i.e. ω
∗ shifts to the right when λ is increased from 0 to
some arbitrary positve level and ω∗ approaches ω∗B (see Figrue 4) from the left
as λ goes to σ−1σ . So, we conclude that - given the wealth distribution - a higher
level of financial development is (apart from local non-monotonies) associated
with a higher number of losers of a trade liberalization.
4.2 Wealth Inequality
To discuss the relationship between the degree of inequality in the distribution
of initial capital endowments and the threshold level ω∗ we have to discuss
15As long as σ−1σ > ρ(1− λ) + λ, the first regime is relevant. Note that, at λ = 0, the LHS
is larger than the RHS whereas at λ ≥ σ−1σ the LHS is smaller than the RHS. In addition,
the RHS is monotonically increasing in λ. So, as λ moves from 0 to σ−1σ we switch from the
first to the second regime.
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the link between the former and the size-distribution of firms (which, in turn,
determines Y ) first.
Inequality and the size-distribution of firms. If the capital markets
are near-perfect (λ ≥ σ−1σ ), all firms are of equal size. Hence the distribution of
initial capital endowments has no influence on the size-distribution of firms. In
contrast, under inexistent capital markets (λ = 0), the size-distribution of firms
coincides with the wealth distribution.
For intermediate levels of λ, we have to distinguish two case. First, a regres-
sive transfer (that leads unambiguously to more uneven distribution of capital
endowments) from one set of unrestricted individuals to another will not aﬀect
the size-distribution of firms. The former group of individuals decreases its net
capital supply exactly to the same extent as the latter increases net capital sup-
ply. Thus, the firm sizes remain unaﬀected. This is also true for all aggregate
variables. This argumentation becomes more complicated in the second case
where we redistribute from restricted individuals.
Lemma 5 If λ < σ−1σ , a regressive transfer that takes away capital from re-
stricted entrepreneurs decreases ρ.
Proof. The regressive transfer decreases - given ρ and Y - (gross-) capital
demand. The restricted recipients may increase their capital demand only to a
smaller extent than the poor donors are forced to decrease their capital demand
(Lemma 1) and the unrestricted recipients even leave their capital demand un-
changed (equation 7). Assume now that ρ remains constant or increases. Given
this assumption and the preceding argumentation, we know that the real output
Y must fall. However, this decline decreases capital demand again. Hence, cap-
ital supply exceeds capital demand. We conclude that ρ must fall to restore the
equality of capital demand and supply.
Since any endowment transfer from a set of restricted poorer individuals to
a set of richer individuals (whether restricted or not plays no role) decreases
the interest rate, some poor individuals - who are possibly not involved into
the transfer - may increase their firm size. Due to this general equilibrium
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eﬀect, the new size-distribution of firms cannot be deemed more unequal than
the original size-distribution. For the same reason, we may not conclude that
an arbitrary regressive transfer decreases real output. The indirect interest rate
eﬀect - leading to bigger project sizes of the non-involved poor - can outweigh the
direct negative eﬀect of a regressive transfer.16 Put in other terms, redistribution
from individuals with high marginal returns to investment to individuals with
a low marginal return does not necessarily reduce output because the interest
rate falls. Hence, the central intuition of models characterized by absent capital
markets (e.g. Be´nabou, 1996) does, in general, not go through if we consider
intermediate levels of capital market imperfections.17
Inequality and the number of losers. Under near-perfect capital mar-
kets (λ ≥ σ−1σ ), the function relating initial capital endowment to income,
y(ω)|λ≥(σ−1)/σ, remains unaﬀected by a regressive transfer since demand does
not change. Under inexistent capital markets (λ = 0), the reduction in aggre-
gate demand leads to a reduction in the incomes of the same relative magnitude.
Accordingly, we conclude that in the former case ω∗ remains unaﬀected whereas
in the latter case ω∗ decreases in consequence of a regressive transfer. For in-
termediate levels of capital market imperfection, a clear-cut prediction how the
threshold level ω∗ behaves cannot be made. Consider first case in which re-
distribution adversely aﬀects output. Two eﬀects going in opposite directions
influence the incomes of the borrowers in this situation. First, demand for each
product decreases. Second, the fall in the interest rate (Lemma 5) reduces
the interest payments of the borrowers. Accordingly, it is in general not clear
whether the incomes in the neighborhood of the ”old” ω∗ shift down or up or,
to put it in other terms, it is not clear whether ω∗ shifts to the left or to the
right. The situation becomes clearer if, as a consequence of a regressive transfer,
output increases. In this situation, the incomes of the borrowers improve for
16This can be shown, for example, in a simple case where the population is divided into two
classes and a certain share of the population is assumed to have no wealth endowment at all.
17It can be shown that an unambiguous prediction about the impact of a regressive transfer
on the real output can be made if the transfer involves the set of the poorest restricted
individuals (no matter how large this set is).
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sure since they not only face lower costs of capital but demand has shifted up
as well. Hence, ω∗ shifts to the right.
We are now ready to discuss how a regressive transfer, i.e. more inequality
in the distribution of initial capital endowments, aﬀects the number of losers of
a trade liberalization. With respect to the group sizes, we have to distinguish
two eﬀects. First, there is a direct eﬀect if the individuals suﬀering from the
transfer had an endowment above ω∗old before the transfer and below ω
∗
new after
the transfer. So, the direct eﬀect increases the number of losers. Put diﬀerently,
the more the distribution is skewed to the left (for a given ω∗) the higher is
the number of entrepreneurs with capital endowment below ω∗. Second, there
is an indirect eﬀect that results from a change in ω∗ and whose direction is
unclear. The strength of the indirect eﬀect, i.e. how many entrepreneurs switch
from losers to winners (or vice versa) due to a change in the threshold level
ω∗, depends of course on the density of the wealth distribution at ω∗old. Note,
however, that, given ω∗old lies somewhere in between the relatively capital-poor
entrepreneurs running smaller establishments and the capital-rich producers,
the indirect eﬀect may not play a particular important role - at least not in
developing countries. As mentioned above, both the wealth distribution and
the size-distribution of firms are characterized by a missing middle suggesting
that the mass of individuals at ω∗ is small. Based on this argumentation we
expect the number of entrepreneurs that oppose a trade liberalization to be
high if the wealth distribution (and therefore the size-distribution of firms) is
strongly polarized.
How does a regressive transfer aﬀect the incomes of the group members
(that are not involved into the transfer) under autarky? Again assuming that
the transfer has a negative impact on Y , we have to distinguish between the
incomes of the borrowers and the lenders.18 Since both the interest rate and
the aggregate demand (by assumption) fall, the lenders which form the largest
part of individuals with capital endowment above ω∗ are clearly worse oﬀ. This
18Note that the relatively rich borrowers and all lenders have a capital endowment above
ω∗, i.e. it is always true that ω∗ ≤ ek.
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suggests that most of the winners of trade liberalization benefit more from this
liberalization when the distribution is more unequal. The income of individuals
with a capital endowment below ω∗ (which are all borrowers) is hit by two
competing eﬀects. First, as it is the case with the lenders, the fall in Y decreases
the demand for their products. Second, the fall of the interest rate decreases
interest payments and therefore improves their income position. Even though it
is in general not clear, we see that there are good reasons to expect that the losers
of a trade liberalization lose more when the distribution is polarized. Based on
this we suggest that the distributional conflicts arising from a trade liberalization
are enforced by a more unequal distribution of capital endowments.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The model developed here incorporates some key elements of the economic envi-
ronment in poor countries. Under autarky, firms are protected from competition
because of high administrative barriers to entry and not due to, for instance,
producing innovative goods. Furthermore, the distribution of wealth among
entrepreneurs is polarized and the level of financial development is low.
We show that, in such an environment, the asset distribution provides an
explanation for trade flows even in the absence of diﬀerences in relative factor
endowments and comparative advantages in technology. Moreover, we highlight
that the distributional consequences of major trade liberalization steps diﬀer
from those that would prevail in more advanced countries. The aim is to gain a
better understanding of why so many poor countries still protect their producers
from foreign competition by high trade barriers.
A key element of our analysis is that, under autarky, high administrative
barriers to entry reduce the incentives (or, as it is modeled here, make it im-
possible) to diversify into other industries even for the typically small number
of capital-rich entrepreneurs. To escape strongly decreasing marginal returns
on the small home markets, they are willing to lend some of their assets. This
improves the credit conditions for the larger number of smaller entrepreneurs.
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To what an extent the latter can seek credit depends in turn on the level of fi-
nancial development. Given that the poor country produces only goods that can
already be bought on the world market, a significant step towards free trade will
reduce the monopoly power of the Southern producers. This pro-competitive
eﬀect has an asymmetric impact on the incomes of the two groups of producers
mentioned above. Capital-rich entrepreneurs will no longer lend parts of their
capital endowment at low rates. Instead, they will produce more and sell parts
of their production on the world market, thereby inducing the interest rate to
rise. It is exactly this adjustment that hurts the poorer entrepreneurs relaying
more or less on external finance under autarky. In more advanced countries,
however, this type of redistribution is less likely to take place. The reason is
that for a larger number of firms, among them also relatively small ones, the
pro-competitive eﬀect of a trade liberalization is small since they produce goods
that are at the technology frontier and do not (yet) have a perfect substitute
counterpart.
The analysis so far leads us the conclusion that, in poor countries, the num-
ber of entrepreneurs opposing significant integration steps, i.e. the size of the
import-competing sector, hinges crucially on the wealth distribution. As further
important determinants we identify the level of financial development and the
extent of addition variety the integration brings. If capital cannot be direct
towards firms with high marginal returns because the lenders have only little
hope to get their funds back, aggregate output (and hence aggregate demand)
is low. Consequently, only entrepreneurs with a very low capital endowment
are in favor of autarky. Similarly, a small number of varieties under autarky is
associated with a small winning group and large number of losers.
A very polarized distribution that gives rise to a large number of entrepreneurs
with only minor asset ownership is associated with a large number of opposers
and only a small winning group. To return to the African example made in the
introduction, this situation corresponds to an economy in which - determined
by history - most capital is owned by capitalist farmers and miners (or the en-
trepreneurs processing cash crops and mineral resources) whereas entrepreneurs
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in the urban manufacturing and industrial sector possess only relatively little
capital. Of course, the way the division into winners and losers translates into
policy outcomes depends on the diﬀerent group’s relative strength in the po-
litical process. One of these groups - beside capital-richer and capital-poorer
entrepreneurs - comprises the workers. Although the latter have not been con-
sidered so far, it seems reasonable to assume that the workers share - at least in
the short run - the interests (with respect to trade policy) of their employers.
Thus, whether a typical poor country is open or closed depends on whether
the small number of capital-rich entrepreneurs (and, perhaps, their workers) ex-
ert an important influence on the government or, in contrast, whether the large
number of capital-poorer manufacturers and small urban industrialist determine
policy. The latter situation was certainly relevant for many developing countries
in Africa during the era of decolonialization when political power moved towards
the capital cities allowing the urban manufactures and industrialists (and, per-
haps, their workers) to exert disproportionate lobbying influence. There is few
evidence that this pattern has systematically changed in recent times.
We are well aware of the fact that there exist many factors that adversely
aﬀect particularly or solely entrepreneurs running smaller firms. For instance,
the costs of dealing with dense regulatory or an ineﬃcient banking system are
fixed giving rise to significant economies of scale. But we challenge the view that
a protectionist trade regime in a monopolistic environment necessarily favors
capital-rich entrepreneurs. If those who run large enterprises are also ”major”
owners of productive resources, whereas ”major” is relative to home demand in
the particular sector the entrepreneur is confined to, then the removal of trade
barriers benefits the large. To put it another way, in the short-run, the trade
liberalization makes it even harder for smaller firms to get external finance.
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Figure 1 – Borrowers and Lenders 
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Figure 2 – Capital Market Equilibrium 
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Figure 3 – Winners and Losers of a Trade Liberalization 
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 Figure 4 – Trade Liberalization and Firm Sizes  
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Figure 5 – Decrease in the Level of Financial Development and Firm Sizes 
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